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CHAPTER 7 
Dimensions of parallelism: some policy 
applications of experimental methods 
CHARLES R. PLOTT 
7.1 Introduction 
The term "paralle lism" refers to a vague notion about how observa-
tions of simple laboratory phenomena can help one understand and 
predict the behavior of a complicated and changing world. Of what use 
are experimental results to someone who is interested in something 
vastly larger and more complicated, perhaps fundamentally different 
than anything that can be studied in a laboratory setting? Questions 
such as this and the related notion of parallelism have probably existed 
from the earliest development of scientific experimental methodology, 
and although I found the term in a paper by Vernon Smith ( 1980) the 
notion itself pervades all branches of science and engineering. 
The purpose of this chapter is to isolate some examples of how the 
issue of parallelism has been approached in economics. The chapter 
outlines several strategies that have been employed in attempts to use 
experimental research in actual policy decision making. The topic to be 
explored is how issues have been posed in these policy-related studies 
so that experimental methods could be applied. The discussion is 
limited to 10 instances in which I have been involved personally at 
some level. 
Many different opinions exist about experimental methodology and 
the relationship between laboratory work, field studies, and policy 
decisions. The opinions are strongly held and are just as likely to be 
held by those with no experience at all in applying the methods as by 
those with much experience. For example, the textbook by Samuelson 
and Nordhaus (1983, p. 8) boldly claims that experiments in economics 
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are impossible. Presumably these authors believe that some sort of 
field study is the only way to approach an application of experimental 
methods. Referee reports frequently reflect methodological philoso-
phies and related concepts of parallelism. Every experimentalist who 
has submitted a paper to a professional journal has read a referee report 
aggressively claiming that the experiments had nothing to do with the 
" real world" or that the experiments were not " relevant" for some 
reason or another. My impression is that such critics have very narrow 
views about the connections between laboratory and naturally occur-
ring situations , and they approach experimental methods with unreal-
istic expectations about what can be learned from applications. 
This impression brings me to my point: Economists should keep an 
open mind about experimental methodology and should judge work by 
the statements of results rather than by methodological principles. 
Methodological principles should evolve from our experiences with 
what works and what does not work. That point is reflected in the title 
and organization of this chapter. The topic is policy research as 
opposed to basic research. The issues are: What was attempted, what 
seemed to work and why, what was a flop and why? 
The examples are organized according to what seems to have been 
the principal strategy for using the experiments. Each strategy can be 
viewed as a " dimension" or form of parallelism between policy 
problems and laboratory experiments. Five different strategies are 
identifiable. Each section treats a different strategy. The discussion 
includes a general description of the strategy, the context of the policy 
problem, and the role of the experiments in the final policy decision if 
any decision resulted. 
7.2 Ex post evaluation of a decision: the flying club 
A policy decision was made. An action was taken. A result was 
observed. What influence did the policy have on the observed result? 
The question suggests a possible role for experiments in the ex post 
evaluation of a policy decision. 
The ex post evaluation of a policy decision motivated the agenda 
experiments reported in Levine and Plott (1977). The policy decision in 
this case was one that Mike Levine and I made to promote the use of 
a particular agenda by a large flying club that was selecting a fleet of 
aircraft. Unknown to all members of the club but ourselves, the agenda 
was designed to influence the club to choose the fleet of aircraft most 
preferred by Levine. The theory underlying the design of the agenda 
was untested at the time the decision was made, and the preferences of 
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the members of the club were largely unknown. Nevertheless, the club 
used the agenda and chose the fleet the agenda was designed to secure. 
Was the agenda responsible for the group choice? Was the " policy" a 
success? The question can never be answered, but educated guesses 
can be made. The role of the experiments is to provide the foundation 
for making an educated guess. 
The context of the decision will make the methodological issue clear. 
The flying club had a fixed amount of money to spend on aircraft. It had 
many options, including a variety of makes, sizes, and equipment. The 
club could buy several aircraft. each of which could be different, and 
the number of possible fleets was in the thousands. The preferences of 
the members of the club differed substantially. Since there were many 
possibilities and no unanimous opinion, how was the group to decide? 
The agenda used by the club is shown in Figure 7. I. The first 
question addressed the primary or basic fleet to be purchased. After a 
primary fleet was chosen, the next issue was the number of aircraft. 
After that question was resolved , the group addressed the question of 
whether more than one type of aircraft should be purchased and how 
many. The final question was how the aircraft should be equipped. 
Notice that each question partitions the options into two sets: a set 
to be rejected and a set to keep for further consideration. In order to 
understand this point consider Figure 7.2 The letter E represents a 
Bonanza E: Fa Bonanza F ; C a Cessna; and A a Bonanza A. For 
practical purposes after the basic fleet was decided , the remaining 
options were considered by a sequence of questions. First , the number 
of aircraft to be purchased was considered (six-plane fleet vs. seven-
plane fleet). After that a series of questions addressed the composition 
of the fleet. Notice that the agenda can be represented in a tree form as 
shown and that a reordering or rewording of the agenda would lead to 
the formation of a different tree. 
The agenda represented in Figure 7.2 was chosen to induce the group to 
choose the option EEEFFCC, which we preferred. This was a fleet of 
five small Bonanza Es and Bonanza Fs with two larger Cessnas. The basic 
idea was to use conflicts among members of the group and the majority 
rule to eliminate options at each stage of the agenda until the remaining 
choices would result in the option (EEEFFCC) that we wanted. Each 
different stage of the agenda uses a different majority to eliminate 
options that we wanted eliminated. 
Our reasoning in designing this agenda involved aspects of theory 
that had not been tested directly, so the utility of our project could 
certainly be questioned. The agenda seemed to work according to plan, 
but how do we know? Perhaps the group's choice was fortuitous and 
had nothing at all to do with the agenda. 
This is the agenda for the Group Ill equipment meeting. Your subcommittee has tried to 
define a series of problems facing the group and to give you an opportunity to express 
your preferences in resolving them. We suggest that you take a few moments to look 
over this agenda and familarize yourselves with the choices facing us. then come to the 
meeting, participate in the discussion, and vote by show of hands on the choices 
presented in alternatives 2--6. We would like to present the Board with the most 
comprehensive possible expression of Group Ill opinion. Please come. 
I. I TRODUCTION: 
Availability. Type variety, Previous Depreciation problems. Needs of the Group vs. 
Cost, Safety, Radio Equipment. 
2. PRIMARY AIRCRAFT TYPE: 
PROBLEM: Survey suggests that many Group lll members perfer that the main part 
of the group fleet be four-seat Bonanzas. Should these be all the same age? If so. we 
could sell all existing Bonanzas and buy new F-33A 's or we could sell only the V and 
F and buy used E-33A 's. If they can be different ages. should we keep our E 's and add 
new F's? Or do we want C-210's? Previous depreciation practices may affect these 
choices. 
INPUTS: 
Costs and rates for new F-33A 's and refurbished E-33A 's. 
Depreciation problems. 
Maintenance comparisons. 
Availability and price of used aircraft. 
VOTE: PRIMARY FLEET TYPE SHOULD BE: 
a. All new F-33A 's at about $29.00 hour: 
b. Refurbished E-33A 's at about $24.00 hour; 
c. Mixed new F-33A 's at about $28.00 hour and refurbished F-33A 's at about $24.00 
hour: 
d. New C-210's at about $25.00 hour. 
3. SIZE OF GROUP III FLEET: 
PROBLEM : Survey suggests that membership considers present availability to be 
unsatisfactory. This summer we operated with a little over five aircraft available. We 
have based our rates on 500 hrs./yr./aircraft. With only five aircraft available, we are 
flying more than that. We can clearly operate six aircraft at 500 hrs./yr./aircraft. We 
might be able to operate seven at that rate. We almost certainly couldn't operate eight 
at 500. If we assume. conservatively, that a seventh aircraft would operate 400 hours 
and an eighth 300 hours, the question becomes. " how much availability do we want to 
pay for?" 
INPUTS: 
Alternative ways of paying for availability. 
VOTE: 
Cost increases associated with availability. 
a. 6 b. 7 c. 8 
Figure 7 .I. Flying club agenda. From Levine and Plott ( 1977). 
SHOULD THE FLEET INCLUDE AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THE PRIMARY 
TYPE? 
PROBLEM: Most members indicated an occasional need for a five- or six-place airplane. 
Others indicated a desire to fly aircraft other than Bonanzas. There are advantages in 
scheduling. rate uniformity, majority choice, and type familiarity in keeping the fleet 
homogeneous. The advantages of operating more than one type include optimizing for 
different mission requirements and accommodating minority preferences. 
INPUT: 
Safety aspects of mixed fleets. 
Survey input on desire for 5-place, 6-place , and mixed fleet. 
VOTE: FLEET SHOULD BE: 
a. All primary type; 
b. Mixture of mostly primary type and some six-place. 
IF SOME SIX-PLACE SHOULD BE INCLUDED. SHOULD THEY BE BONANZA 
A-36's or C-210's? 
PROBLEM: Each of the two has advantages and disadvantages and different costs. 
1 PUT: 
Weight and Balance and Performance comparisons. 
Maintenance comparisons. 
A-36 costs and advantages. 
C-210 costs and advantages. 
VOTE: SHOULD SECONDARY AIRPLANES BE: 
a. A-36 at about $31.50 hour? 
b. C-210 at about $27.00 hour? 
ADDITIO AL EQUIPMENT. 
PROBLEM: It has been club policy (and probably will be in the future) to equip aircraft 
alike. Most of the group has indicated a preference for glideslopes. and the cost 
discussions so far have included them. Others have discussed DME's, radio-coupled 
autopilots (no altitude hold), and encoding altimeters (to meet Group I TCA 
requirements starting 7/ In4). 
I PUT: 
Cost and uses of equipment. Increase in cost/hour. 
VOTE: 
Would you like to have the following equipment if it increased cost per hour by the 
following amounts? 
YES NO 
-- DME at about $--hour. 
--Coupled autopilot at about $--hour. 
-- Encoding altimeter at about $--hour. 
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EEEFFF 
EEEFFC 
EEEFFA 
Item 4•• 
secondary 
fleet 
EEEFFFF 
EEEFFFC 
EEEFFFA 
EEEFFCC 
EEEFFAA 
secondary 
flee t 
Item 5• 
C's 
A ' s 
Figure 7 .2. Schematic representation of flying club agenda. The item numbers 
marked with a single asterisk correspond to the numbers on the original 
agenda. The double asterisks indicate that the formal agenda listed only item 
4. but the group correctly understood that it had two components-item 4 and 
item 4'. At the meeting the group did not vote formally on item 4. because no 
one advocated an unmixed fleet. The group simply moved to consider item 4' 
directly. From Levine and Plott ( 1977). 
In order to test the effectiveness of our efforts , we designed a series 
of experiments. If the agenda failed to have an influence in a variety of 
experiments that involved conflicts similar to that of the flying club, we 
would be willing to say that our efforts had had no effect. lf we found 
that we could use an agenda to influence group choice as we predicted. 
our confidence in the effectiveness of our efforts would be bolstered. 
A questionnaire circulated by the club after the decision had been 
made provided data about the membership's preferences. The actual 
decision made by the group was checked against the prediction of the 
agenda model when applied to the reported preferences. The data were 
consistent with the model. but chance could still be an explanation. 
Next, we designed a series of experiments guided by the reported 
preferences. The objective was to see if the influence of the agenda 
could be demonstrated using those preferences in addition to prefer-
ences that would be even harder to manipulate. 
Monetary incentives were included to induce preferences over an 
abstract set of options (letters of the alphabet). For example, an 
individual might receive $8 if the letter A was chosen. $5 if B was 
chosen. and so on. The amount a particular individual would receive 
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given the group choice of an option was known only to that individual, 
reflecting the fact that the happiness or degree of satisfaction of any 
member of the flying club was unknown to others. The induced 
preferences were similar to those reported by club members. The 
agenda was the same as the club agenda, except that all reference to 
airplanes and related terms was removed. 
During the experiments, we demonstrated the influence of the 
agenda decisively by changing the agenda while holding preferences 
fixed. First an option was picked by the experimenter. The model was 
applied to find an agenda that would influence the group to choose that 
option. The experiment was conducted with that agenda. Then a 
second option was selected and an agenda was constructed to induce 
the group to choose it. An experiment was then conducted with that 
agenda. The agenda certainly and predictably influenced the decisions 
in these experiments. 
Did the agenda influence the outcome of the flying club meeting? 
Two assumptions must be made in order to draw an inference: (I) The 
preferences of the flying club were similar to those induced in the 
laboratory. (2) The relationship between the act of voting and prefer-
ences was the same for the individuals in the flying club meeting as it 
was for those individuals in the laboratory. If both assumptions are 
accepted, the agenda must have had an influence on the outcome of the 
flying club. 
The issue now focuses on assumptions (I) and (2). If (I) is doubted, 
new experiments can be conducted in which the induced preferences 
more closely approximate those hypothesized for the club members. In 
principle all preference patterns could be examined , so assumption (I) 
provides no problem for the application of experiments. Any criticism 
along the lines of (1) is not an objection to the use of experiments; quite 
the contrary , it is a call for more experiments. 
Assumption (2) involves a theory of behavior. In essence it requires 
the hypothesis that the voting decisions of all people, including those of 
the flying club and those in our experiments. can be reasonably 
captured by the model used to design the agenda. The acceptance of 
this general theory is a key to the application. To the extent that it can 
be demonstrated to be unreliable, the conclusions drawn from the 
theory about the cause of the flying club decisions can be challenged. 
Again , however, we discover that the challenge does not involve an 
objection to the use of experimental method. Instead, the challenge is 
a call for additional theory and perhaps more experiments. Additional 
theory would be simply an improved replacement of the old, and the 
additional experiments would be tests of it. 
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The basic theory of the agenda appears to work well in the laboratory 
setting. The voting decisions of individuals depend on the packaging of 
options in the agenda. In the design of an agenda, this dependence can 
be relied upon to induce a majority to accept or eliminate a set of 
options. The extent to which one is prepared to assert something about 
the voting decisions of the fl ying club seems to be an unavoidable 
matter of subjective judgment concerning one·s confidence in the two 
assumptions. A variety of prefert<nces have been checked and, so far, 
no exceptions to the behavioral theory have been exhibited. 
7.3 Demonstration: landing slot allocations 
On occasion the implications of theory are so clear and the results of 
previous experiments so unambiguous that professionals have little to 
learn from experiments. Nevertheless, a theory that seems obviously 
relevant to professionals is frequently abstract and complicated to 
those who have the power and responsibility to make decisions. 
Sometimes in a policy-making environment even the word '"theory" is 
pejorative. In such cases experiments provide a way of demonstrating 
the ideas without resort to theoretical constructions. The role of 
experiments as a demonstration of theory was the basis of a Polinomics 
report (Grether, Isaac, and Plott. 1979) on the allocation of airline 
landing slots. 
After the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, staff members of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) became concerned about the method of 
allocating the right to land at four major airports (Washington National 
Airport, Kennedy, La Guardia, O'Hare). The allocation decisions were 
made by committees. Each airport had a separate committee consisting 
of those airlines that had been certificated by the CAB to operate at the 
ai rport. 
In 1968 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had limited the 
number of slots (takeoffs and landings per hour) that could be con-
ducted at each of these airports. The committees were charged with the 
task of determining by '"agreement" the allocation of slots among the 
certificated carriers. What might happen if the committees failed to 
reach unanimity was unclear. The FAA might have administratively 
allocated the slots. but the criterion it would have used was uncertain 
and the role of politics in the process made the consequences of default 
uncertain. Since the committees had successfully achieved agreement 
every six months from 1968 until the time of the study (1979), what 
might have happened if the committees had failed was only a matter of 
speculation . 
The situation changed with the Airline Deregulation Act. The CAB 
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staff became concerned that the committees could be used as a barrier 
to new competition. I was contacted to study the committees because 
of my previous work on committee behavior. The question posed was 
related to the degree to which the committee process of allocating slots 
was compatible with the Airline Deregulation Act. 
After we had undertaken some study and attended committee 
meetings , the nature of the committee behavior became clear and the 
structure of a reasonable process that could replace the committees 
became apparent. The appropriate model of the committee would have 
been immediately obvious to anyone with some game-theoretic and 
economic training. The committee operating under unanimity would 
attain some point in the '"core" in the appropriate game without side 
payments. The location of the core would be very sensitive to the 
beliefs about what would happen if the committee defaulted. Simply 
put , an individual would rather veto an option than accept a committee 
decision less preferred than the option that would evolve as a result of 
the veto. The core would be an option preferred by everyone to the 
consequences of default. If such options existed , one of them would be 
chosen and , if not, the committee would default. 
Since there were no side payments, an allocation in the core would 
not necessarily be efficient in an economic sense. That is, the airlines 
that would acquire the slots under the committee process would not 
necessarily be the carriers that valued the slots the most. In a 
cost-benefit sense the wrong carriers would get the slots. Furthermore, 
the allocation would be sensitive to airline beliefs about the conse-
quences of default , and these beliefs would be sensitive to politics as 
opposed to economics. 
Reasonable alternative processes involved markets with initial allo-
cations determined by auction, or by lottery. or perhaps grandfathered 
with an aftermarket. Such alternative processes were very controver-
sial and poorly understood by the airlines and public. 
The role of the experiments was twofold. First , the experiments 
demonstrated the implications of the game-theoretic model used to 
evaluate the committee process. The emphasis is on the word " dem-
onstrated'' because the implications of the model were fully under-
stood theoretically at the time , and previous experiments left little 
doubt that the substantive implications of the model would be predic-
tive of committees operating under laboratory conditions. For those 
who had previously studied a wide range of committee experiments. 
very little was to be learned from additional experimentation. 1 
1 Consult Fiorina and Plott ( 1978) . These experiments and subsequent publi -
cations provide substantial support for the core as a behavioral model under 
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The audience, which consisted of CAB staff. Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) staff, FAA staff, and the airlines. had no previous 
experience with committee experiments. Nor did the audience under-
stand or have a tendency to accept game theory. Thus given the 
political and controversial nature of the issue. some demonstration that 
the theory had content was necessary. The purpose of the experiments 
was to demonstrate the major consequences of the theory when applied 
to the slot allocation committee process while avoiding any detailed 
discussion of the content of the theory. the axioms, or mathematical 
structure and also avoiding any long and academic discussions about 
why the theory might be true. The strategy was one of demonstration. 
The parameters for the committee experiments were chosen to 
reflect beliefs about the actual committee parameters. Part of the study 
involved a demand-curve estimation for a certain period at Washington 
National Airport. These parameters. scaled down appropriately, were 
the ones chosen for the experiment. The subjects in most experiments 
were adults, preferably with some connection to the aerospace indus-
try (e.g., aeronautical engineers). These decisions were made in 
anticipation of a claim that the committees under the field parameters 
would behave differently and/or that people from the industry are 
different from other people. In addition, participants in some commit-· 
tees made several decisions together, reflecting the fact that sequences 
of decisions are characteristic of the slot committees. 
Each individual was given a monetary incentive to acquire units of 
an abstract commodity. which from the experimenter's point of view 
represented the slots. In some experiments individuals participated in 
isolated committees. In other experiments individuals participated in 
more than one committee. and the value of slots received from one 
committee was dependent on the decisions made by the other commit-
tee. Such preference interdependencies or complementarities among 
the choice variables of different committees represented interdepen-
dencies among airports. A carrier might not want a slot to take off from 
O'Hare if it did not have a slot to land at Washington National Airport. 
The values of slots varied substantially among participants. These 
differences represented the different levels of economic potential that 
characterized different carriers . 
Each committee had a fixed number of units to allocate. The rule was 
unanimity. In some experiments each individual was given a (different) 
majority rule. Less experimental work existed on the behavior of the rule of 
unanimity, so technically speaking the experiments did have something to 
add. 
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quantity that represented the number of units he or she would get if the 
committee was unable to decide in the allotted amount of time (usually 
one hour). In other experiments the allocation was decided randomly in 
the event of a committee default. 
The experiment made three points: ( I) The outcome of the commit-
tee process is sensitive to the consequences of default; this point was 
made by experiments with identical preference parameters but dif-
ferent default rules. (2) The committee processes with different com-
mittee meetings for different airports could not deal efficiently with 
interdependencies among the ajrports. (3) The committee process 
would be insensitive to profitability of carriers and thus not promote an 
efficient allocation of resources. This point was made along with (I) by 
the inducement of high values for slots for some participants and very 
low values for others. The experiment demonstrated that. except for 
the bounds placed on decisions by the consequences of default, the 
value placed on slots by participants was unrelated to the allocation 
chosen. The allocation chosen was governed by the consequences of 
default and not participants' values. 
The results of the committee experiments were not controversial. All 
three points were clearly evident in the data. Under unanimity a great 
pressure exists for equality of distribution, and unless a large allocation 
could be protected by a guarantee of a large quantity in the event of a 
default , participants had difficulty keeping it. For example, large 
carriers that should grow according to the economics of the situation 
never did so and usually contracted under the committee process. 
Inefficient carriers that should leave the airport never did so under the 
comrillttee because they had no incentive to leave. The experiments 
provided a means by which the consequences of the theory of the core 
for the allocation of airport resources could be communicated without 
reference to the theory itself. 
The report proposed the creation of a market for slots to replace the 
committees. Slots were to be auctioned by means of a first rejected bid, 
sealed-bid auction with an aftermarket. Markets and auctions had 
received some attention in the trade literature. Almost uniformly 
authors predicted that disastrous consequences would follow if mar-
kets were used to allocate the slots. This literature provided an 
excellent background for the experiments. The following questions 
were posed: (I) How do the committees perform relative to the 
proposed market process, and (2) do any of the disastrous predictions 
made in the trade literature actually occur if auctions are used? 
Specifically the market experiments were conducted to demonstrate 
(1) that "rampant speculation" does not occur, (2) that the values 
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placed on slots by the large carriers do not dictate slot prices because 
price is determined by the marginal buyer, and (3) that the problems 
poorly solved by the committee process would be solved more 
efficiently by a particular type of market process. All three points were 
clearly demonstrated by the experiments. 
The report was adopted and promoted by the CAB. It was the 
subject of many public hearings and a notice of proposed rule making. 
The recommendations to replace the committee with a market process 
were very controversial. but the experiments were never criticized. In 
fact. the economic analysis was accepted in the sense that the critics 
chose to question the CAB's authority to implement such a scheme. 
and the tools used by critics to back up such claims were congressional 
and international political pressure . 
The exact role of the experiments in this process is difficult to 
ascertain. The report was supplemented by detailed transcripts of three 
of the committee meetings. Quotations from these meetings were used 
to buttress the results of the theory and experiments. No doubt these 
were read carefully, and from these texts alone the logic of the theory 
could be detected. The experiments probably prevented certain types 
of claims from surfacing in policy debates and also gave confidence to 
governmental staff members who needed to support their views with 
data. Something other than pure theory was necessary. 
Staff at the FAA were opposed to market policies from the begin-
ning. They were certainly not convinced by the experiments and 
funded experiments from another group that they hoped would discon-
firm our findings. The follow-up experiments conducted by another 
group were o complicated that no conclusion could be drawn from 
them. They attempted to use members of the industry who applied 
their own valuations brought from the field. In the sense of modern 
experimental economics. the study had no controls. 
The recommendations of the Polinomics report were not imple-
mented in 1979. However. attempts to implement variations of the 
recommendations have been made almost every year since then. The 
analysis of the committees has been almost completely accepted by all. 
including the airlines and even the FAA. The committees themselves 
began to deadlock by 1982. By 1984. the airlines had recommended that 
the committees be replaced with a modification of the Polinomics 
recommendation that l proposed as an alternative (Aviation Daily, 
1983). This alternative grandfathered airlines at current slot holdings. 
created a market for slots. and provided that new capacity be auc-
tioned. The FAA. which had assumed a leadership role in opposing all 
forms of market allocation. aggressively opposed this proposal in favor 
of its own plan to allocate slots administratively. In the fall of 1985 the 
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DOT issued a notice of proposed rule making to implement the 
proposal. That rule became law on April I. 1986. Since then legislation 
has been drafted in both the House and the Senate that would reverse 
the rule. 
7.4 Shifts in the burden of proof 
Experimental data can influence the burden of proof in an ongoing 
policy debate. In this context experiments seem to be as much tactical 
as a means of gathering facts about the nature of the actual situation. 
The objective of the experiment is to establish the need for proponents 
of the other side of the argument to prove or disprove something before 
· a policy discussion can proceed in their favor. Specifically, in the cases 
discussed in this section, proponents of the other side had made claims 
about a complex situation based on a very general economic model. 
The experiments were designed to check the accuracy of that model. If 
the model advocated because of its generality failed to be reliable in the 
simple case of the experimental markets. the burden of proof would 
presumably rest on the advocate to explain why it did not work . If a 
model is so general that it can be applied to some very complex 
situations, one would naturally expect it to be reliable in the simple 
situations. If the model performs sufficiently badly in the experiment, 
the burden is on the model's advocate to explain why the experiments 
were "special" or "different" from the complex case in which the 
model is suppo ed to work. Failing that. the generality of the model is 
in ques tion and the application to the complex ca e is in doubt. Thus 
the experiments do not address the field situation directly. Rather, they 
address the theory that one side or the other has used to analyze the 
field situation. 
The strategy is not foolproof. The side that should accept the new 
burden of proof might choose to ignore the results. Intellectual honesty 
notwithstanding, something must force the burden if the strategy is to 
work. The shift in the burden-of-proof tactic has been explicitly used in 
two studies. Some of the demonstration arguments used by Grether, 
Isaac, and Plott in the Polinomics airport slot study could be counted 
as a third instance of shift of burden-of-proof strategies. 
7.4 .I Inland waterways barge traffic 
Railroad companies were lobbying a high-level administrator to require 
barges to post rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 
The railroads argued that the public information feature of posted rates 
would make the industry more competitive. permit the railroads to 
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compete more effectively against the barges, and aid the small barge 
owners who were allegedly secretly being undersold by the large barge 
companies. The administrator was skeptical of the arguments but had 
no basis for expressing his skepticism. He commissioned an experi-
mental study (Hong and Plott. 1982) that became the first attempt to 
apply recently developed experimental methods to an actual policy 
problem. 
The inland waterways barge industry i complex. Traffic exists on 
both coasts and in the Great Lakes region. Much of the industry exists 
on the Mississippi River and its tributaries. A great variety of products 
are hauled with boats , and firms are specialized accordingly. The first 
task of the study was to isolate a portion of the industry that had 
minimal complications . That portion would serve as a model for the 
creation of a laboratory industry. 
A small portion of the Mississippi River was chosen. Only dry bulk 
cargo was incorporated into the basic model. Dry bulk was the major 
product for this stretch of the river. Parameters from governmental 
studies, judgments by industry people, and judgments by the research-
ers were used to characterize that portion of the industry during the 
year for which the best data were available. A laboratory experiment 
was conducted that represented a dramatically scaled down version of 
the industry. 
The industry had about 15 grain shippers, the buyers of barge 
services. All were of approximately equal size. Between 25 and 35 
barge companies existed. The size of a company could be measured by 
the number of boats it operated . Rough estimates of the volume of 
cargo shipped were available and served as the basis for demand and 
supply estimates. 
The difficult part was determining an appropriate scale. Since a tow 
down the river took about a month, the number of boats translated into 
the number of tows a company could undertake. A unit in the 
experiment became one-half tow, and a period represented two weeks. 
A participant with a capacity to deliver five units in the experiment 
represented a company with more than five boats. The costs associated 
with units for sale in the experiment corresponded to engineering cost 
estimates for barges. An upward-sloping supply curve reflected a high 
marginal cost of upgrading marginal equipment and entry into the 
grain-hauling business by firms ordinarily hauling something else. The 
overall elasticity of supply was structured to reflect the best guesses 
about the industry. Elasticity of demand was similarly chosen. When 
the scale parameters were applied to the experimental parameters, the 
known industry aggregates were recovered . 
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A price-posting institution was used for two experimental sessions. 
The price-posting institution previously studied in laboratory work has 
many features similar to the rate-posting procedures used by the ICC. 
A second two experiments were conducted with a telephone market. 
All buyers and sellers were located in different rooms with telephones, 
and orders were negotiated and placed by phone. The telephone 
market was arguably analogous to the existing form of organization. 
Parameters were identical across all four markets. 
In the price-posting markets, prices were higher. efficiencies were 
lower, and the small sellers made less profits than in the telephone 
markets. The results were exactly opposite to the predictions made by 
the railroads. Furthermore, the experiment provided estimates of the 
amount of business that would be shifted to the railroads if posted 
prices were required. The study was sufficient to make the administra-
tor wary of the claims of the railroads. In private conversations they 
were challenged to explain the results. The administrator claimed that 
with evolving scientific evidence against their case he was not in a 
position to help them. The lobbying effort was diminished, and the 
policy advocated by the railroads was never pursued. The fact that a 
presumption existed against their case was sufficient to deter further 
lobbying efforts. 
The administrator's use of this study was not widely supported 
within DOT. After the administrator left, the study was to have been 
published but was blocked by a staff economist who feared it would 
earn Proxmire's Golden Fleece Award and who in any case thought the 
idea of doing laboratory experiments in economics was foolish . At the 
time ( 1977) one could not use the authority of a large number of 
published papers to contest his belief. The study itself was then 
rejected by the Journal of Political Economy, which suggested that a 
paper with the details of the barge application removed and replaced by 
survey-oriented material might be acceptable. This suggestion came 
after the referees had mistakenly claimed that the results were due to 
an artifact of the experimental procedures. 
7.4.2 The Ethyl case 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought action against the major 
manufacturers of tetraethyl and tetramethyl lead, the lead-based gas-
oline additives that increase octane levels. The basis of the lawsuit was 
four practices widely used in the industry: (I) delivered pricing, (2) 
most favored nations clauses, (3) automatic matching of competitors' 
prices, and (4) advance notification of price increases. The experiments 
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reported in Grether and Plott ( 1984) were conducted for the FTC to be 
used as rebuttal testimony in this case. 
The government's claim was that these four practices when taken as 
a group increased prices in an ··anticompetitive" fashion. The logic is 
as follows. Delivered pricing removes the potential for under-the-table 
price discounts in terms of free services . Delivery is the only major 
service provided to customers by producers. Most favored nations 
assure customers that no other customer is buying at a lower price. 
This policy eliminates a source of small price concessions in response 
to individual customer pressure. It is similar to the posted price of a 
rate bureau. What you see is what you get -there are no negotiations. 
Meet or release clauses tie prices to that of a competitor. It is the 
precommitment to a trigger-price policy. A company will not win 
customers away from a competitor by price concessions because as 
soon as the lower price becomes known the competitor lowers its price 
automatically. Advance notification requires a 30-day notice in ad-
vance of price increases. By giving a 40-day advance notice , compet-
itors were aware of a 10-day window to bring prices up to the new 
level. If they failed to act in I 0 days, the company that made the notice 
would necessarily retract it because of the practice of matching prices. 
Thus by giving a 40-day notice a company gives competitors a choice 
between all competitors having the higher price and there being no 
price increases by anyone. 
The four defendants' reply to the charge that the practice had an 
anticompetitive effect was that they were an oligopoly. According to 
the defen e , the practices had no effect on industry performance 
because there was no room for an effect. The industry enjoyed high 
(but not illegal) prices fostered by industrial concentration. According 
to the defendants' claim. any high prices and/or profits were accounted 
for entirely by industrial structure and therefore were unrelated to the 
four practice . The profits were not eroded by entry because the 
government"s decision to phase out leaded gasoline served as an 
effective barrier to entry . 
The experiments were designed by Grether and Plott to serve as a 
basis for rebuttal testimony for the government. Was the industry's 
claim true? Is it a fact that the practices necessarily have no influence 
when the industrial organization is that of the industry? If the answer 
is no. the defendants could not claim that the high profits and price are 
necessarily unrelated to the government's case . A major tenet of their 
argument would be damaged. 
Laboratory experiments were designed to match the numbers of 
suppliers and demanders. concentration ratios. demand elasticities. 
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excess capacity, and so on. that are known properties of the industry. 
Special care was taken to anticipate questions that one could imagine 
during cross examination. Would the attorney attempt to make the 
experimental argument look foolish? The subjects were not undergrad-
uates. For the most part they were employed adults preferably with an 
engineering background and/or some connection to the oil industry. 
The subjects participated in more than one experiment. Several 
different variations of the practices were studied. Consistency in design 
with that of previous experiments was sought so the weight of the 
authority of different types of experiments conducted by others could 
be used. Wherever possible, the consistency of the results with " the 
tradition of experimental research" was established. Testimony of 
respondents ' experts was studied carefully so different forms of the 
rebutted theory would be recognizable within the experimental design. 
Many replications were done. Some experiments were blind in the 
sense that the experimenter conducting the experiment did not know 
the parameters. A double blind experiment was considered, but the 
experiment was so complicated that it could not be conducted by 
novices. 
The results of the experiments were decisive in showing that the 
practices could have a substantial impact. The results were circulated 
to the respondents, but the government decided (correctly) that the 
case could be won without the rebuttal testimony provided by the 
experiments. Since these experiments were novel and since experi-
ments had never before been introduced in any court, a decision was 
made not to enter the experimental results into testimony . Presumably 
there would have been no problem getting the experiments admitted as 
evidence (Kirkwood. 1981). The government won the case on the first 
round , but the defendants won on appeal. 
After the trial a seminar on the experimental results was conducted 
at the FTC. Discussions with the defense lawyers following the 
seminar revealed some of their thinking. They had studied the several 
variations of the practices reported in the paper. One of the variations 
in which the practices were not strictly enforced resulted in prices 
slightly above the competitive equilibrium. Counsel for the defense 
asked if that treatment was the best approximation of the actual 
practices. The questions made sense because the practices as found in 
the industry were not perfect. Evidently, the first line of defense would 
have been to attempt to use the experimental data as evidence in 
support of the counsel's own position. In retrospect our experimental 
case could have been a better tool for the prosecution if we had built 
the detailed exceptions to perfect enforcement into the design. Given 
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the nature of the imperfect practices found in the field , the experimen-
tal results would probably not have changed at all had this change been 
made. 
An interesting feature of all three attempts to use the shift of burden 
of proof strategy is that the experiments were designed to mirror the 
industry as closely as possible. Relative sizes of buyers and sellers, 
demand elasticities, numbers of participants, and so on were all similar 
to those of the target industries. This was done to prevent the 
application of theories that attempt to show that the behavior of the 
laboratory industry will differ from that of the industry. Each imagin-
able difference between the experimental setting and the field is the 
starting point for a potential theory. An infinite number of such theories 
necessarily exists. 
The logic is as follows. Individual A (railroads in barge study, the 
defense in the Ethyl case) has used a general theory T to infer 
something about the industry and its performance. Individual B (the 
experimenter) has noted that, under experimental circumstances E, 
theory T is not reliable. Thus T is not reliable in general because it is 
not reliable in E. Individual B then asks A to explain why T can be 
applied to the industry. That is, B places a burden of proof on A to 
show why T is applicable to the industry but not under condition E. 
Now B does not want A to have readily available some specified 
property of E that might be used to argue that E is an (uninteresting) 
exception to the general reliability of T. Each difference with the 
industry serves as a basis of a potential theory. For example, the 
laboratory results might be attributed to the special concentration 
ratios used in the experiment that differ from the industry's. The 
laboratory results might be attributed to the use of people experienced 
in the industry. The laboratory demand elasticity might differ from the 
industry, and so on. Such theories can be checked through additional 
experiments, but time and money are involved. The best strategy is to 
eliminate as many potential theories as possible so the burden of proof 
is not easily shifted back to its original position. · 
7.5 Direct extrapolation: air freight posting 
Policy choices require making decisions, and the weight of the evi-
dence is a subjective issue that rests with the decision maker. Studies 
designed to answer one set of questions might provide a decision maker 
with sufficient insight to act on a completely different set of issues. 
Such was the case with the CAB air freight rate decision. 
Before 1980 air freight forwarders were required to post their rates 
with the CAB. Having studied the influence of posted prices in the 
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early Plott and Smith (1978) study and the barge study (Hong and Plott, 
1982), the CAB made the reasonable presumption that posted prices 
reduce market efficiency. On the basis of existing laboratory results 
and in the spirit of deregulation, the CAB issued a notice of proposed 
rule making to eliminate air freight rate posting. Seeing no claims that 
the presumption was incorrect, the CAB acted and eliminated the 
policy of rate posting. 
7.6 Potential design: prepolicy research 
Two experimental studies (Plott and Wilde, 1982; Lynch et al., 1984) 
were developed as tools with which to study policy options. Both were 
initially financed by the FTC, which has an interest in consumer 
protection. The staff of the commission is exposed to many competing 
policy prescriptions aimed at correcting alleged market failures. 
The problem faced by the staff was that neither the "market failure" 
nor the influence of a " proposed remedy" can be clearly observed with 
field data. The experimental strategy was to create markets that would 
reliably "fail." Such markets could then be used to study the proper-
ties of proposed policy remedies as implemented in those markets. The 
experiments conducted were not focused on any particular industry or 
potential decision. nor were they designed to "test" any particular 
theory directly. Rather, they had characteristics of a variety of markets 
and alleged market problems that were the concern of the commission. 
The degree to which some theory or model might help explain their 
behavior was a secondary concern. 
The experiments were complicated. The use of random devices and 
the associated training were nearly a separate experiment. Because of 
the nature of information acquisition and use, new types of market 
organization were imposed. Several different types of institution were 
studied that sometimes varied according to subtle aspects of when 
people were informed about their own preferences, the properties of 
commodities, and what they might do as a consequence. A full 
description of these experiments is far beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
The Plott and Wilde study focused on markets in which the con-
sumer bas only a limited capacity to evaluate the commodity (e.g., the 
services of a physician or perhaps the services of an automobile 
mechanic) and in which the seller might have a financial incentive to 
mislead the buyer. Experiments were conducted in which sellers 
offered two types of commodities (e.g., medical procedures). The 
relative value of these commodities to buyers depended on the state 
taken by some unobserved random variable (e.g., the infirmity). Only 
212 Charles R. Plott 
clues or statistics dependent on the state (e.g., symptoms) were 
observable. In some experiments the buyer could observe and interpret 
the clues. Sellers in these markets had a complicated supply response 
because of the multimarket nature of the setting, but they had no 
special function of information supply. When the sellers could interpret 
the clues and the buyers could not, the sellers had an additional 
important function. In addition to a supply response, the sellers gave 
advice to buyers and interpreted the buyer symptoms as part of the 
sale. The economic questions focused on models of the efficiency with 
which such markets operate. Would the buyer receive good informa-
tion? Would the buyers act on it? 
The Lynch et al. study also focuses on asymmetric information in 
markets. Markets were created in which low-quality products were 
delivered even though high-quality deliveries were Pareto superior. In 
this sense the study was very successful, because we were able to 
create such markets. The study then turned to the role of reputation 
and warranties in improving the efficiency of the markets. 
An interesting feature of the Lynch et al. study is an experimental 
design involving sequential decisions. Recall that "theory tests" were 
not the primary purpose of the experiments. Instead, the strategy was 
first to try an extreme case in which almost aU models predict that 
"lemons" would be produced. If the lemons phenomenon was dem-
onstrated by the first phase of experimentation, the strategy was then 
to see if the most likely corrective policy as suggested by most theories 
would be effective. This policy involved the introduction of required, 
costlessly enforceable warranties. A failure at either end of this 
spectrum would have provided the background for a large series of 
negative results (about the applicability of theory) and subsequent 
experiments of a completely different sort. The positive results at the 
extremes that were actually observed were used as a foundation for 
exploring the more delicate phenomena between the extremes in which 
warranties were not required, enforceable, and so on. 
Neither proposed legislation nor proposed rule making resulted from 
either study. The researchers learned much about the limitations of 
broad statements concerning behavior that have accompanied past 
policy decisions. The experiments also provided many insights into the 
nature of models that are being applied to consumer protection 
problems. The hope is that these background experiments will be the 
basis for additional experimentation and policy analysis. 
7.7 Design 
Sometimes economic problems require completely new types of orga-
nization and decision processes. In such cases history supplies no data, 
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and a unique opportunity exists for experimental work. Experiments 
can provide some, perhaps limited experiences on which to base 
judgments about the nature of appropriate organizations and policy. 
Such situations are properly called problems of organizational design. 
Three instances are outlined here. 
7.7.1 Slot exchanges 
Following the slot allocation process study by Grether et al. (1979), the 
air controllers' strike occurred and the committees at the various 
airports began to deadlock. The number of constrained airports ex-
panded from 4 to 22. A decision was made to create a "slot exchange." 
Air carriers were given temporary grandfather rights to their historic 
level of slots. The plan was to allow carriers to meet and exchange slots 
within and across airports on a one-for-one basis. 
How should the process be organized? The problem was nontrivial 
because the size of the exchange was staggering. The number of 
commodities measured in the thousands, and the number of agents 
measured in the hundreds. The politics of the situation dictated that no 
buying or selling be allowed, so no numeraire existed. The logistics 
problem was enormous. 
My role in this process was as a consultant for a carrier that wished 
to trade away from one airport to get to another. As a participant in all 
organizational meetings , I was involved in the design of the process. 
The ultimate process was constructed on the basis of experiences 
with experiments with one-sided oral auctions. The only difference was 
that bids were to be tendered in writing rather than orally. Each carrier 
listed slots that it wished to acquire together with slots that it would 
take in exchange. The form of these proposed trades was that any slot 
in column A would be exchanged for any slot in column B. These lists 
of bids were collected and circulated to all carriers. With the list of 
proposed trades, carriers searched for chains of trades that involved 
their own proposals. At this stage of searching for trades, carriers were 
free to add new proposed exchanges that had the effect of a proposal 
being accepted or a chain of trades being completed. 
The process was not well understood . However, pilot experiments 
had been conducted at the California Institute of Technology. The 
carrier that had employed me had practiced and had a strategy for 
dealing effectively with the process. Since our " team" had well-
defined ideas about how the logistics of the process might work, we had 
little difficulty in convincing the group of all carriers to adopt the 
process. The process and improved variations were used many times, 
including a brief period when monetary transactions could take place 
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and a period in which " many-for-one" trades were permitted. The 
entire affair was similar to a large experiment, and given the constraints 
it worked rather smoothly. 
7.7.2 Westchester County Airport 
The county of Westchester in New York decided to auction access to 
its airport terminal. The terminal is small and safety codes limited 
passenger usage to a maximum of 40 enplane and 40 deplane passen-
gers in any 15-minute period. In addition, a maximum of four aircraft 
could use the parking pads at any time, and at most, two of these could 
be large aircraft. 
When the county had taken action to limit the use of the terminal to 
the stated capacity limitations, it became involved in a lawsuit. The 
judge ordered the county to devise a mechanism for allocating the 
available capacity that was consistent with the Airline Deregulation 
Act. The county chose to develop an auction system that was to be 
used in the event that a settlement could not be attained. 
The auction was designed by Glen George, a graduate student at the 
California Institute of Technology, and myself. It was important to 
avoid many potential criticisms of auction processes that litigants 
might raise, and it was necessary to conform to the realities of politics. 
The carriers might more readily accept a process that tended to allocate 
rents to carriers, so a one-price auction was used. In a discriminative 
auction, sellers pay what they bid. In a one-price auction, the high 
bidders pay the value of the excluded bid. If the demand curve is 
"steep," the former generates greater revenue to the seller than does 
the latter (Miller and Plott, 1985). Because the continuum of time was 
unwieldy, the day was divided into 15-minute segments. Capacity was 
divided into five passenger enplane blocks and five passenger deplane 
blocks. Thus two separate markets existed every 15-minute period of 
the day in which eight passenger blocks were sold in each. Carriers 
wished to tie purchases together, so provisions for special constraints 
that tied enplane purchases to deplane purchases were designed. 
Carriers were also allowed to submit multiple bids tied together with a 
constraint that canceled all other tied bids if one of the set was 
accepted. 2 
The number of markets together with the possibility of constraints 
resulted in a very large and potentially complex auction. Experiments 
2 Many of the ideas were motivated by Rassanti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982). The 
combinatorial auction was not feasible because of practical and technical 
problems. 
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were conducted using demand conditions similar to those believed to 
exist at Westchester County Airport. The purpose of the experiments 
was to answer some very practical questions: (I) Were the instructions 
clear about how to tender bids and use the constraints? What types of 
confusion were we likely to encounter? (2) Did unusual strategies exist 
that might undermine any efficiency properties of the auction process? 
(3) Were we likely to encounter a computational problem in determin-
ing the winning bids? We could imagine problems that would exceed 
our computer capacity. The solution to the auction involves a large 
integer programming problem, the dimensions of which are very 
sensitive to the number of constraints. The use of bids and constraints 
is not governed by the logic of the problem, so we had no a priori way 
of determining the size of the computational problem without actually 
trying the auction. 
The experiments were invaluable. Many problems were uncovered 
at every stage. The instructions were not clear. We did not have a firm 
grasp of the game theory, and the experiments provided insights about 
the strategic possibilities. Computational problems did exist. The 
whole process was redesigned several times after bugs surfaced during 
the experiments. Experiments are stilJ being conducted to improve the 
process. 
The process was not used at Westchester County Airport. The 
respondents settled by adopting the process I proposed for Washington 
National Airport (Aviation Daily, 1983) discussed in Section 7.3. The 
original laboratory experiments and the field experiments with the slot 
exchanges have provided convincing evidence that markets in slots wilJ 
"work." All of this evidence made carriers happy with a market for 
slots, although the FAA remained adamantly opposed. Now the New 
York Port is considering an auction process for the three major airports 
in New York City. The research and refinements on the Westchester 
County problem are relevant to the Port's problem. 
7.7.3 Space station 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is plan-
ning to place a manned space station in orbit. The station will be used 
as a research laboratory, as a manufacturing facility, and for a variety 
of other purposes. The users will be the U.S. government, foreign 
governments, and private corporations. The Reagan administration 
wants the capacity to be allocated by some sort of pricing system. A 
team of economists at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has been given the 
task of designing a pricing mechanism. 
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The task is complicated by the existence of nonconvexities, exter-
nalities, large common costs, much uncertainty, and other factors . In 
addition, NASA cannot operate for a profit or even take money for that 
matter, so profit centers and related decentralized schemes do not 
seem to be feasible. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the 
space station design is in a continuous state of evolution , and the 
design of the system itself should be affected by the pricing scheme. 
The proposed role of experiments in this project is much different 
from that in previous research. Some testing of institutional influences 
is underway (Banks, Plott, and Porter, 1986), but the central role is to 
be slightly different. The experiments are to be used as a heuristic - a 
tool for organizing thoughts and questions as opposed to a tool for 
answering questions. Most experimenters have noticed that the proc-
ess of designing experiments makes the researchers aware of compli-
cations and interdependencies that would have otherwise escaped 
notice. The space station project is intended to capitalize on this 
feature of the method. 
The space station is just finding its way to the drawing boards. The 
variables are not even known, much less the costs. The experimental 
plan is to conduct simulations of pricing policies under experimental 
conditions that reflect much of the physical, institutional, and motiva-
tional aspects of the space station. The ultimate subjects will be the 
NASA personnel who are building the station. The purpose will be to 
instruct the personnel on the nature of competing policy options by 
providing them with some experiences with their operation. It is hoped 
that such exercises will generate insights about the features of the 
station, its cost, engineering structure, service capacities, and so on 
and thus make the simulation of policy options useful. 
7.8 Closing remarks 
The theme of this chapter is that "parallelism" involves many different 
dimensions that reflect the nature of policy analysis. Parallelism takes 
different forms , but there seems to be no formula for choosing an 
appropriate one. Instead, the use of laboratory methods in policy 
contexts seems to be an art involving a skillful and very subjective 
choice of experimental conditions. The laboratory results are sources 
of experience under conditions that it is hoped will be useful to those 
responsible for making decisions. The role of experiments in policy 
contexts is an activity more akin to practice than to some sort of 
scientific pursuit of truth. Experimentation is a source of experience 
similar to the experience one acquires as one practices the piano before 
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a concert or that a team acquires as it practices before a game. The 
connections between such experiences and final performance can have 
many dimensions. The kinds of useful practice undertaken in prepara-
tion for a football game can range from ballet to scrimmage. The 
scrimmage itself can involve plays that the coach thinks the opponent 
will use as well as plays the coach is sure will not be used but are 
nevertheless educational. Similarly, experiments that provide the best 
insights about the nature of upcoming options might include faithful 
reproductions of the anticipated situation, but certainly there is no 
reason to believe that good experiments necessarily take that form. 3 In 
fact , there is no a priori reason to believe that faithful reproductions 
would be of any use at all. 
Having compared this type of research with practice, it may come as 
no surprise that I am particularly uncomfortable with the concept of 
external validity. First , the word "external" involves a needless 
commitment to the proposition that there are no general principles of 
behavior that govern simultaneously both laboratory and "other" 
situations. If both laboratory behavior and field behavior are governed 
by the same principles as is believed to be the case in economics, it 
makes little sense to think in terms of "external"' and "internal" 
behavior; all of the behavior is " internal." Second, the word "va-
lidity'' sets a standard that is impossible to meet in policy contexts. An 
economic policy decision will constitute a unique event in history. The 
exact circumstances will not be repeated. Many unobserved parame-
ters will be in operation. There is in principle no way to " validate., 
theories about what might happen. Simple judgment cannot be 
avoided. The experiments simply shape the thought processes, the 
data. and the arguments that form that judgment. 
I do not intend to suggest that policy applications of experiments 
involve only rhetoric. Although opinions of policymakers are clearly 
important, the research objective is not simply to alter opinions. The 
objective is to make a correct guess about what will happen if a policy 
is put into operation. The purpose of the experiment is to make the 
guess as informed in the light of experience as possible. 
3 My own thoughts about how one might learn something from experiments 
were influenced by environmental engineers at the California Institute of 
Technology. The engineers were attempting to determine the flow of effluents 
that might result from a change in release in the ocean near Los Angeles. 
They were studying currents in a large pool constructed in the basement of a 
building on the campus. Of course, their pool looked nothing at all like the 
Pacific; yet it taught them something about their models , and it was the 
models that helped them learn something about the Pacific. 
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My approach to applied work has been to forget the concept of 
external validity and not to take the concept of parallelism too literally. 
Instead, the approach has been pragmatic in the sense that the use of 
experiments in each project has been justified by whatever arguments 
seemed appropriate given the context. What kind of experiment would 
make the guess work inherent in policy decision making more in-
formed? The purpose of this chapter was to survey some of what was 
done to see to what extent some order or method actually existed after 
all. Laboratory studies and policy problems are connected by a 
many-dimensional correspondence. This chapter has outlined a few of 
those dimensions. 
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